The Perilous Frontier
Sep. 24th, 2011 02:47 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
stoutfellowThomas Barfield's The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757 is, as its name suggests, an analysis of the relations between China and the peoples of the steppe from the Han Dynasty to the rise of the Ching (Manchu) Dynasty. I found it fascinating; a review is under the cut.
It is (or was, before Barfield) usual to consider China and the steppe empires as forming a bipolar system, alternating in dominance. Barfield contends that this is a mistake, that it is in fact more revealing to recognize three loci of power: the sedentary Chinese, the nomads of the northwestern frontier (Xiongnu, Uighurs, Turks, Mongols), and the mixed society of the northeast (Toba, Jurchen, Manchus). He describes a cycle of power relations, repeating several times before being disrupted by the Mongols under Genghis Khan, with one last and significantly different iteration following.
The cycle begins with the rise of a native Chinese dynasty. As it extends its power, it may attempt to take the offensive against steppe raiders, but this proves ineffective, and the dynasty reverts to a defensive stance, coupled with the judicious use of tribute to buy off the nomads. Typically, they select one powerful chieftain and provide him with food and luxury goods. This enables him to distribute those same goods as largesse to subordinates and allies, building a new confederation of steppe nomads. This, of course, requires him and his successors to press for yet more tribute; even so, it is cheaper for the Chinese to pay one chieftain much tribute than to pay smaller amounts to every minor leader who decides to try his hand at frontier-raiding. The Chinese emperor gains another advantage from this; later in the dynasty, as it weakens and unrest rises among the Chinese themselves (usually in the south), suppressing rebellion is easier when the imperial infantry is supplemented with mercenary steppe cavalry. Also, the Chinese and steppe armies are jointly capable of keeping any power from rising in the northeast.
Eventually, of course, the native dynasty loses control, and China descends into warlords' fiefs. At the same time, the steppe confederacy disintegrates, as its leaders lose access to Chinese tribute. Dissatisfied underlings resume raiding on their own account, accelerating the collapse of the native dynasty. Meanwhile, in the northeast, some powerful nomad clan, no longer suppressed by their neighbors, takes control of part of the sedentary population to their south (but still outside China proper). This forces them to develop the governing tools necessary to rule their new subjects, by setting up a dual government - a traditional one, to govern the nomads who provide the new state with military might, and a more bureaucratic one for the newly conquered peasantry. (Usually, defecting Chinese officials help establish this last.) By the time China descends into chaos, their northeastern neighbors have ample experience ruling sedentary peoples, and have no difficulty extending their rule deep into north China. (Rarely do they conquer more than this.) Unlike the Chinese, they have the military tools necessary to take the offensive against the steppe nomads, and so long as they hold power prevent a new confederacy from arising.
The new, non-native dynasty is usually short-lived, however. The rulers, controlling far more Chinese than nomads, inevitably sinify - not because they are seduced by the glittering luxuries of civilization, but because Chinese-style governance is more centralized and powerful than the traditional nomadic rule, and the (by now troublesome) allies and subordinates who helped them to power can be suppressed by this means. Paradoxically, this weakens their military power, and when a resurgent native power arises, usually in the south, it has little difficulty pushing the invaders out - at which point the cycle resumes.
The Mongol irruption under Genghis and Kublai broke the pattern. Rather than being satisfied with tribute, Genghis decided on full-scale conquest, and, being a military genius, he achieved what no earlier steppe nomad had. All of China fell to the Mongols in Kublai's time, but - predictably - the same temptation to sinification followed, leading, eventually, to the Mongols' overthrow by the Ming dynasty. But the disruption of the cycle continued. Though some advisers in the Ming court urged resumption of the traditional system of tribute, another faction, terrified by the prospect of another steppe conquest, successfully argued for a policy of sowing division among the nomads, rather than allowing them to unite into a new confederacy. This was a continual drain on the Ming's military and finances, and rebellion broke out, this time not in the south as usual but in the northwest, where military governors grew tired of repeated bloody and futile strikes at the Mongols. Meanwhile, a new power arose in Manchuria and began co-opting some of the fragmented Mongols; when the Ming fell to a rebellious governor, the Manchu state stepped in to fill the resulting vacuum. (It was, eventually, to fall to yet another southern uprising, but this one established a republic. The cycle had finally been broken.)
The book is rich in detail. Its discussion of the perennial weakness of steppe confederacies, owing to multiple incompatible theories of succession, is quite interesting. Briefly: there was a strong tradition of lateral succession, from brother to brother, and a less common tradition of hereditary succession, itself divided between primogeniture and, perhaps oddly but more commonly, ultimogeniture - descent to the youngest son, with his older brothers receiving powerful fiefdoms under his overall command. Where lateral succession was pursued, a crisis inevitably arose when one generation's stock of brothers was exhausted: shall the reign pass to the children of the first-ruling brother, or the last? The question was almost always resolved by civil war. In this light, the murderous customs of the Ottoman Turks, among whom a new ruler's first act was to massacre most of his male relatives, seems a drastic but effective response to a perpetual problem. (The Turks, of course, originated as steppe nomads, before being driven west by the rising Mongol power.)
I was delighted by the framework the book suggests for understanding Chinese history. I have had quite a bit of difficulty getting a handle on that subject, and I think Barfield's work will help me overcome that. I recommend The Perilous Frontier very highly.
It is (or was, before Barfield) usual to consider China and the steppe empires as forming a bipolar system, alternating in dominance. Barfield contends that this is a mistake, that it is in fact more revealing to recognize three loci of power: the sedentary Chinese, the nomads of the northwestern frontier (Xiongnu, Uighurs, Turks, Mongols), and the mixed society of the northeast (Toba, Jurchen, Manchus). He describes a cycle of power relations, repeating several times before being disrupted by the Mongols under Genghis Khan, with one last and significantly different iteration following.
The cycle begins with the rise of a native Chinese dynasty. As it extends its power, it may attempt to take the offensive against steppe raiders, but this proves ineffective, and the dynasty reverts to a defensive stance, coupled with the judicious use of tribute to buy off the nomads. Typically, they select one powerful chieftain and provide him with food and luxury goods. This enables him to distribute those same goods as largesse to subordinates and allies, building a new confederation of steppe nomads. This, of course, requires him and his successors to press for yet more tribute; even so, it is cheaper for the Chinese to pay one chieftain much tribute than to pay smaller amounts to every minor leader who decides to try his hand at frontier-raiding. The Chinese emperor gains another advantage from this; later in the dynasty, as it weakens and unrest rises among the Chinese themselves (usually in the south), suppressing rebellion is easier when the imperial infantry is supplemented with mercenary steppe cavalry. Also, the Chinese and steppe armies are jointly capable of keeping any power from rising in the northeast.
Eventually, of course, the native dynasty loses control, and China descends into warlords' fiefs. At the same time, the steppe confederacy disintegrates, as its leaders lose access to Chinese tribute. Dissatisfied underlings resume raiding on their own account, accelerating the collapse of the native dynasty. Meanwhile, in the northeast, some powerful nomad clan, no longer suppressed by their neighbors, takes control of part of the sedentary population to their south (but still outside China proper). This forces them to develop the governing tools necessary to rule their new subjects, by setting up a dual government - a traditional one, to govern the nomads who provide the new state with military might, and a more bureaucratic one for the newly conquered peasantry. (Usually, defecting Chinese officials help establish this last.) By the time China descends into chaos, their northeastern neighbors have ample experience ruling sedentary peoples, and have no difficulty extending their rule deep into north China. (Rarely do they conquer more than this.) Unlike the Chinese, they have the military tools necessary to take the offensive against the steppe nomads, and so long as they hold power prevent a new confederacy from arising.
The new, non-native dynasty is usually short-lived, however. The rulers, controlling far more Chinese than nomads, inevitably sinify - not because they are seduced by the glittering luxuries of civilization, but because Chinese-style governance is more centralized and powerful than the traditional nomadic rule, and the (by now troublesome) allies and subordinates who helped them to power can be suppressed by this means. Paradoxically, this weakens their military power, and when a resurgent native power arises, usually in the south, it has little difficulty pushing the invaders out - at which point the cycle resumes.
The Mongol irruption under Genghis and Kublai broke the pattern. Rather than being satisfied with tribute, Genghis decided on full-scale conquest, and, being a military genius, he achieved what no earlier steppe nomad had. All of China fell to the Mongols in Kublai's time, but - predictably - the same temptation to sinification followed, leading, eventually, to the Mongols' overthrow by the Ming dynasty. But the disruption of the cycle continued. Though some advisers in the Ming court urged resumption of the traditional system of tribute, another faction, terrified by the prospect of another steppe conquest, successfully argued for a policy of sowing division among the nomads, rather than allowing them to unite into a new confederacy. This was a continual drain on the Ming's military and finances, and rebellion broke out, this time not in the south as usual but in the northwest, where military governors grew tired of repeated bloody and futile strikes at the Mongols. Meanwhile, a new power arose in Manchuria and began co-opting some of the fragmented Mongols; when the Ming fell to a rebellious governor, the Manchu state stepped in to fill the resulting vacuum. (It was, eventually, to fall to yet another southern uprising, but this one established a republic. The cycle had finally been broken.)
The book is rich in detail. Its discussion of the perennial weakness of steppe confederacies, owing to multiple incompatible theories of succession, is quite interesting. Briefly: there was a strong tradition of lateral succession, from brother to brother, and a less common tradition of hereditary succession, itself divided between primogeniture and, perhaps oddly but more commonly, ultimogeniture - descent to the youngest son, with his older brothers receiving powerful fiefdoms under his overall command. Where lateral succession was pursued, a crisis inevitably arose when one generation's stock of brothers was exhausted: shall the reign pass to the children of the first-ruling brother, or the last? The question was almost always resolved by civil war. In this light, the murderous customs of the Ottoman Turks, among whom a new ruler's first act was to massacre most of his male relatives, seems a drastic but effective response to a perpetual problem. (The Turks, of course, originated as steppe nomads, before being driven west by the rising Mongol power.)
I was delighted by the framework the book suggests for understanding Chinese history. I have had quite a bit of difficulty getting a handle on that subject, and I think Barfield's work will help me overcome that. I recommend The Perilous Frontier very highly.
