If Dogs Could Talk
Aug. 9th, 2010 05:59 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
stoutfellowVilmos Csányi is an ethologist, a student of animal behavior, specializing (as one might guess) in dogs. In If Dogs Could Talk, he provides a layman's introduction to the results of his studies of canine psychology, combining anecdotes of his own dogs with descriptions of experiments; the result is a lively and fascinating story. (It is also a controversial one; Csányi counts himself as one of the "New Anthropomorphists", who are willing to acknowledge the possibility of animal minds, but require scientific verification of claims about those minds. I suspect that the majority of ethologists would currently disagree.) A more detailed discussion is under the cut.
The book begins with a discussion of the wolf and its psychology, of the changes that dogs underwent as they ceased to be wolves, and of the ancient alliance between dogs and humans. The impact of that alliance on dogs is considerable; Csányi points out that, though the brain of the dog is somewhat smaller than that of the wolf, the diminished regions are largely in the sensory regions, and thus this does not imply lesser intelligence. Indeed, he suggests that, as regards social intelligence, dogs are superior to wolves - the society in which they participate is more fluid and at the same time more tightly knit, not to mention that it involves two different species!
The second section of the book examines the ways in which canine psychology has come to resemble that of humans: the importance of cooperation, the learning and internalization of rules, and the relatively open expression of emotion. In each of these respects, dogs differ sharply from wolves. Csányi here also discusses bonding, which has several unusual characteristics in dogs: it may occur in adulthood, it may shift from one focus to another (as anyone who's adopted a shelter dog knows), and it is more likely to occur between dog and human than between dog and dog.
In the third section, Csányi goes into considerable detail about his own two dogs, Flip and Jerry. The anecdotes are entertaining; I find one, in particular, very striking. Csányi's dogs are allowed to beg at the table; however, there is a set hand-signal which tells them to stop begging. On one occasion, Csányi had a friend over for dinner. Flip, one of the dogs, began to beg, first from Csányi, then from his wife Eve, and finally from his friend. The friend asked how he should respond; Eve showed him the hand-signal. Flip responded by barking furiously at Eve, and then resuming begging from the friend. Csányi remarks:
The fourth section is devoted primarily to the problems of scientific investigation of animal minds, and to some of the experiments Csányi and his associates have carried out. The key question is whether members of a given species have a "theory of mind" - whether they are able to make assumptions about the aims, intentions, plans, and ideas of other individuals and act on those assumptions. There is considerable (though somewhat controversial) evidence that chimpanzees have a theory of mind; in particular, they have been seen apparently attempting to deceive other chimpanzees. Csányi suggests that there is similarly persuasive evidence that dogs, too, have a theory of mind. One experiment in support of this claim is detailed. The dog is first taught to point out the location of a hidden treat to its master. Next, the treat is hidden in a place that the master can only reach by using a cane; the dog waits for its master to retrieve the cane and then points out the treat. Finally, the cane as well as the treat is hidden, sometimes by the master, sometimes by someone else. In the former case, the dog simply waits, as before, but in the latter case it will point out the location of the cane, and only then of the treat. This is by no means decisive, but it does suggest the possibility that dogs can take the state of knowledge of another into account.
The concluding section is a plea for the humane treatment of dogs, especially taking into account the intellectual capacities Csányi believes they have.
As one who has long shared his life with dogs, I am naturally sympathetic to claims concerning their intelligence, and no doubt that bias influences my inclination to accept Csányi's claims. Nonetheless, I do believe that his work, as described in this book, makes it at least plausible that dogs do have a fairly high level of intelligence. They do not have all the capacities of, say, chimpanzees, but they do have some - and they have some human-like capacities that chimps do not seem to share, presumably from their long participation in human society. In any event, I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in questions of animal intelligence.
1. The accent on Ernö's name should actually be a double-acute accent, but I don't know how to reproduce that. Apologies.
The book begins with a discussion of the wolf and its psychology, of the changes that dogs underwent as they ceased to be wolves, and of the ancient alliance between dogs and humans. The impact of that alliance on dogs is considerable; Csányi points out that, though the brain of the dog is somewhat smaller than that of the wolf, the diminished regions are largely in the sensory regions, and thus this does not imply lesser intelligence. Indeed, he suggests that, as regards social intelligence, dogs are superior to wolves - the society in which they participate is more fluid and at the same time more tightly knit, not to mention that it involves two different species!
The second section of the book examines the ways in which canine psychology has come to resemble that of humans: the importance of cooperation, the learning and internalization of rules, and the relatively open expression of emotion. In each of these respects, dogs differ sharply from wolves. Csányi here also discusses bonding, which has several unusual characteristics in dogs: it may occur in adulthood, it may shift from one focus to another (as anyone who's adopted a shelter dog knows), and it is more likely to occur between dog and human than between dog and dog.
In the third section, Csányi goes into considerable detail about his own two dogs, Flip and Jerry. The anecdotes are entertaining; I find one, in particular, very striking. Csányi's dogs are allowed to beg at the table; however, there is a set hand-signal which tells them to stop begging. On one occasion, Csányi had a friend over for dinner. Flip, one of the dogs, began to beg, first from Csányi, then from his wife Eve, and finally from his friend. The friend asked how he should respond; Eve showed him the hand-signal. Flip responded by barking furiously at Eve, and then resuming begging from the friend. Csányi remarks:
They may throw me out of various scientific societies for this, but I believe Flip understood the situation exactly right, namely that Eve was teaching Ernö1 the signal for "no!" and that is why he became mad. "I'll thank you not to mess around with my affairs!" I need not dwell on what high order of intellectual ability is needed for this: about that of a four-year-old child.
The fourth section is devoted primarily to the problems of scientific investigation of animal minds, and to some of the experiments Csányi and his associates have carried out. The key question is whether members of a given species have a "theory of mind" - whether they are able to make assumptions about the aims, intentions, plans, and ideas of other individuals and act on those assumptions. There is considerable (though somewhat controversial) evidence that chimpanzees have a theory of mind; in particular, they have been seen apparently attempting to deceive other chimpanzees. Csányi suggests that there is similarly persuasive evidence that dogs, too, have a theory of mind. One experiment in support of this claim is detailed. The dog is first taught to point out the location of a hidden treat to its master. Next, the treat is hidden in a place that the master can only reach by using a cane; the dog waits for its master to retrieve the cane and then points out the treat. Finally, the cane as well as the treat is hidden, sometimes by the master, sometimes by someone else. In the former case, the dog simply waits, as before, but in the latter case it will point out the location of the cane, and only then of the treat. This is by no means decisive, but it does suggest the possibility that dogs can take the state of knowledge of another into account.
The concluding section is a plea for the humane treatment of dogs, especially taking into account the intellectual capacities Csányi believes they have.
As one who has long shared his life with dogs, I am naturally sympathetic to claims concerning their intelligence, and no doubt that bias influences my inclination to accept Csányi's claims. Nonetheless, I do believe that his work, as described in this book, makes it at least plausible that dogs do have a fairly high level of intelligence. They do not have all the capacities of, say, chimpanzees, but they do have some - and they have some human-like capacities that chimps do not seem to share, presumably from their long participation in human society. In any event, I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in questions of animal intelligence.
1. The accent on Ernö's name should actually be a double-acute accent, but I don't know how to reproduce that. Apologies.
