"All the Shah's Men", 2
Feb. 26th, 2006 10:43 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
stoutfellowI won't attempt a full-blown synopsis of Kinzer's All the Shah's Men, but instead offer, under the cut, a few comments general and specific.
Iran before the 20th century. Kinzer presents a cursory history of Iran from the Achaemenid period to the late 19th century. My knowledge of that history is not extensive, but some of his comments don't jibe with what I understand. In particular, he suggests a philosophical or sub-philosophical continuity between Zoroastrianism and Shi'ism - Shi'ism specifically, as opposed to the great influence Zoroastrianism had on all three of the Abrahamic religions. I'm inclined to doubt that connection, among other things because Persia was majority-Sunni until Shah Isma‘il I forcibly imposed Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion in the early 16th century.
Kermit Roosevelt. Roosevelt was the architect of the coup against Mossadegh, and seems to have been a remarkable character. Readers of Lois McMaster Bujold's novels may detect a resemblance between Roosevelt and a certain pint-sized Admiral, although Roosevelt's subsequent career does not seem to have been anywhere near as successful. If Mossadegh is the star of the story, Roosevelt deserves second billing.
The Iranian political landscape. Mossadegh was the head of a loose coalition called the National Front, united principally in their nationalism and resentment of British interference in Iranian affairs. One of his most powerful, if uncertain, allies was Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani; in the initial stages of the nationalization debate, and during the attempts of the Truman administration to mediate, Kashani was even more adamant than Mossadegh - so much so that, even if some sort of compromise had been reached, Kashani might have scuttled it. Even so, by the time of the coup, the Ayatollah had turned against Mossadegh and was induced to support the plotters.
The British were able to enlist the support of the incoming Eisenhower administration by raising the specter of Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Tudeh was not part of the National Front, certainly, but they had a fair amount of popular support, and the British pointed to the prospect of a power vacuum following Mossadegh's eventual death or fall from power. Kinzer suggests that Tudeh's failure to act in the crucial hours of the coup may have been a decisive factor in its success; this dithering may have been related to the political turmoil in the USSR following the death of Stalin.
Mossadegh. Kinzer presents Mossadegh as a generally sympathetic character, but there are hints here and there of dark waters. Most notable is the following anecdote. Late in 1951, Mossadegh came to the United States to speak at the UN and to negotiate with the British via USAn mediators. Neither side was willing to bend, and the negotations failed. As Mossadegh was preparing to return home, Vernon Walters made a last-ditch appeal, but was rebuffed.
There is an endearing coda, describing the way his memory is cherished in his home village - not so much for what he did as Prime Minister, but for his work on behalf of the village during the long years of house arrest that followed the coup.
The aftermath. Kinzer points out that the coup of 1953 was the first attempt by the CIA to topple another government, and that its success may have paved the way for further actions later. (The overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala came only a year later.) He also notes the clear connection between the 1953 coup and the attitude of the Iranian revolutionaries towards the US, a quarter-century later, and speculates on the possible causal links between the coup and the rise of terrorism. It's not clear to me that, had Mossadegh managed to block the coup, such things would not have come anyway; the 1953 coup was only the latest in a series of actions by western governments, and he might well have fallen soon anyway. The National Front was fraying badly (at least in part due to British and USAn machinations), and the inability of the newly nationalized oil company to find skilled workers (again, largely due to British interference) would likely have worsened Iran's economic situation for some time to come. But all that is mere speculation; certainly the way the coup actually took place tarnished the image of the US in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world.
Some reviewers have blasted Kinzer's book as biased, and he certainly does approve of Mossadegh rather more than the British or Mossadegh's internal enemies. Kinzer does, however, attribute a substantial part of the blame for the crisis to Mossadegh (though not as much as to the British). Biased or not, the book is fascinating and more than a little disheartening. It is certainly worth reading.
Iran before the 20th century. Kinzer presents a cursory history of Iran from the Achaemenid period to the late 19th century. My knowledge of that history is not extensive, but some of his comments don't jibe with what I understand. In particular, he suggests a philosophical or sub-philosophical continuity between Zoroastrianism and Shi'ism - Shi'ism specifically, as opposed to the great influence Zoroastrianism had on all three of the Abrahamic religions. I'm inclined to doubt that connection, among other things because Persia was majority-Sunni until Shah Isma‘il I forcibly imposed Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion in the early 16th century.
Kermit Roosevelt. Roosevelt was the architect of the coup against Mossadegh, and seems to have been a remarkable character. Readers of Lois McMaster Bujold's novels may detect a resemblance between Roosevelt and a certain pint-sized Admiral, although Roosevelt's subsequent career does not seem to have been anywhere near as successful. If Mossadegh is the star of the story, Roosevelt deserves second billing.
The Iranian political landscape. Mossadegh was the head of a loose coalition called the National Front, united principally in their nationalism and resentment of British interference in Iranian affairs. One of his most powerful, if uncertain, allies was Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani; in the initial stages of the nationalization debate, and during the attempts of the Truman administration to mediate, Kashani was even more adamant than Mossadegh - so much so that, even if some sort of compromise had been reached, Kashani might have scuttled it. Even so, by the time of the coup, the Ayatollah had turned against Mossadegh and was induced to support the plotters.
The British were able to enlist the support of the incoming Eisenhower administration by raising the specter of Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Tudeh was not part of the National Front, certainly, but they had a fair amount of popular support, and the British pointed to the prospect of a power vacuum following Mossadegh's eventual death or fall from power. Kinzer suggests that Tudeh's failure to act in the crucial hours of the coup may have been a decisive factor in its success; this dithering may have been related to the political turmoil in the USSR following the death of Stalin.
Mossadegh. Kinzer presents Mossadegh as a generally sympathetic character, but there are hints here and there of dark waters. Most notable is the following anecdote. Late in 1951, Mossadegh came to the United States to speak at the UN and to negotiate with the British via USAn mediators. Neither side was willing to bend, and the negotations failed. As Mossadegh was preparing to return home, Vernon Walters made a last-ditch appeal, but was rebuffed.
"Dr. Mossadegh", Walters replied, "you have been here for a long time. High hopes have been raised that your visit would bring about some fruitful results, and now you are returning to Iran empty-handed."Mossadegh was certainly a bit of a chameleon; for example, he often presented himself as being in very fragile health, but occasionally, at a moment's notice, he would cast aside his cane and stride briskly to greet people he liked. And yet, there do seem to have been bedrock principles from which he would not retreat; his reluctance to crack down on the demonstrations which paved the way for the coup may have cost him his power. In an interview much later, his grandson asserted that he knew the coup was coming, but saw full-scale civil war as the only way to stop it, and rejected that possibility.
At this, Mossadegh stared at his friend and asked, "Don't you realize that in returning to Iran empty-handed, I return in a much stronger position than if I returned with an agreement which I would have to sell to my fanatics?"
There is an endearing coda, describing the way his memory is cherished in his home village - not so much for what he did as Prime Minister, but for his work on behalf of the village during the long years of house arrest that followed the coup.
The aftermath. Kinzer points out that the coup of 1953 was the first attempt by the CIA to topple another government, and that its success may have paved the way for further actions later. (The overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala came only a year later.) He also notes the clear connection between the 1953 coup and the attitude of the Iranian revolutionaries towards the US, a quarter-century later, and speculates on the possible causal links between the coup and the rise of terrorism. It's not clear to me that, had Mossadegh managed to block the coup, such things would not have come anyway; the 1953 coup was only the latest in a series of actions by western governments, and he might well have fallen soon anyway. The National Front was fraying badly (at least in part due to British and USAn machinations), and the inability of the newly nationalized oil company to find skilled workers (again, largely due to British interference) would likely have worsened Iran's economic situation for some time to come. But all that is mere speculation; certainly the way the coup actually took place tarnished the image of the US in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world.
Some reviewers have blasted Kinzer's book as biased, and he certainly does approve of Mossadegh rather more than the British or Mossadegh's internal enemies. Kinzer does, however, attribute a substantial part of the blame for the crisis to Mossadegh (though not as much as to the British). Biased or not, the book is fascinating and more than a little disheartening. It is certainly worth reading.
