Means of Ascent
Oct. 13th, 2012 01:08 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
stoutfellowA few days ago, I finished reading Means of Ascent, the second volume of Robert Caro's biography of Lyndon Johnson. I briefly commented on the first volume here; under the cut, some comments and speculations on the second.
The first volume left me with an extremely negative view of Johnson as a person, but it was mitigated by some very creditable achievements, most notably his role in the electrification of the Texas Hill Country. In the second volume, Johnson's behavior is even worse - and this time he did nothing to make up for it. The book begins with his defeat by Pappy O'Daniel in the special Senate election of 1941, and ends with his tainted victory over Coke Stevenson, running for the same seat in 1948. In the 1941 election, Johnson cheated; so did O'Daniel, and neither was outside the norms of Texas politics of the era. Johnson made a strategic blunder on Election Day, which allowed O'Daniel's men to out-cheat him. In 1948, Johnson's duplicity began early, continued late, and went far beyond those norms - and it gave him a Senate seat, and the lasting nickname of "Landslide Lyndon". (At first, he embraced the nickname, but after only a few years he tried to put it behind him. Needless to say, he failed in this.)
The years between those elections were years in the wilderness for Johnson. He still held his seat in the House, but his status as a rising star had been tarnished. He was - as he always had been - a singularly ineffective legislator, introducing only two minor bills and co-sponsoring none. His real gifts, for sucking up and for bullying, were diminished by his failure in 1941, and after President Roosevelt's death he lost his entree to the White House as well. (FDR liked Johnson; Truman... did not.) He spent those years building his personal fortune and extending his power base in Texas, preparatory to his second Senate run. He knew that that would be his last shot; defeat in 1948 would have put an end to his political career. (What would have become of him in that case is unknowable; he was in position to become a media magnate, at least in Texas, but Caro suggests that this would not have satisfied his obsessive need for personal power.)
Johnson's treatment of his subordinates - and that includes his wife - was abominable. He expected slavish devotion, and got it from a surprising number of seemingly strong personalities. (Some of his employees foresaw their likely fates, and got out while the getting was good - thereby earning Johnson's enmity.) His corruption continued unabated, from his longtime alliance with the Brown & Root oil company and his new ties to Texas bosses like George Parr, the legendary Duke of Duval. Both of those were central to his theft of the Senate seat in 1948. Caro exposes the details of the crime, aided by the confession of one of Parr's henchmen, who felt himself released from his vow of fealty to the Duke by the latter's death. Johnson's victory remained precarious, however, as several suits and countersuits were brought; in these, he gained the support of the White House, since he was expected to support Truman against the Dixiecrats, which his opponent would not have. It was, of all people, Hugo Black who made the final, critical ruling in Johnson's favor.
It is interesting to speculate on the two Senate bids. What if Johnson had won in 1941, or lost in 1948? In the former case, a bit more patience might have been enough to seal the victory; and what might Sen. Johnson's subsequent career have been like? FDR liked him; might Roosevelt have chosen to take advantage of his formidable campaigning (and other) skills in 1944, when he was searching for a new running mate? (Perhaps not; Texas, unlike Missouri, was safely Democratic...) If so, we get President Johnson twenty years early. Johnson would not, I suppose, have pushed through the Civil Rights Act of 1948; there would be no Dixiecrat walkout, the breakup of the Roosevelt coalition might have been postponed, and - I suspect - the 1960s might have been even more violent than they were. Then there's the question of Korea....
The other way: what if Johnson had lost in 1948? Fast forward to 1960: who does John Kennedy pick as his running mate? Surely not someone with Johnson's jawboning skills. Do we get the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965? Maybe not - and the summers get a little longer, and a little hotter. Maybe things turned out for the best after all....
One last, perhaps irrelevant comment. Brown & Root, which was so central to Johnson's political rise, was later absorbed into another Texas energy company... Halliburton. The more things change....
The first volume left me with an extremely negative view of Johnson as a person, but it was mitigated by some very creditable achievements, most notably his role in the electrification of the Texas Hill Country. In the second volume, Johnson's behavior is even worse - and this time he did nothing to make up for it. The book begins with his defeat by Pappy O'Daniel in the special Senate election of 1941, and ends with his tainted victory over Coke Stevenson, running for the same seat in 1948. In the 1941 election, Johnson cheated; so did O'Daniel, and neither was outside the norms of Texas politics of the era. Johnson made a strategic blunder on Election Day, which allowed O'Daniel's men to out-cheat him. In 1948, Johnson's duplicity began early, continued late, and went far beyond those norms - and it gave him a Senate seat, and the lasting nickname of "Landslide Lyndon". (At first, he embraced the nickname, but after only a few years he tried to put it behind him. Needless to say, he failed in this.)
The years between those elections were years in the wilderness for Johnson. He still held his seat in the House, but his status as a rising star had been tarnished. He was - as he always had been - a singularly ineffective legislator, introducing only two minor bills and co-sponsoring none. His real gifts, for sucking up and for bullying, were diminished by his failure in 1941, and after President Roosevelt's death he lost his entree to the White House as well. (FDR liked Johnson; Truman... did not.) He spent those years building his personal fortune and extending his power base in Texas, preparatory to his second Senate run. He knew that that would be his last shot; defeat in 1948 would have put an end to his political career. (What would have become of him in that case is unknowable; he was in position to become a media magnate, at least in Texas, but Caro suggests that this would not have satisfied his obsessive need for personal power.)
Johnson's treatment of his subordinates - and that includes his wife - was abominable. He expected slavish devotion, and got it from a surprising number of seemingly strong personalities. (Some of his employees foresaw their likely fates, and got out while the getting was good - thereby earning Johnson's enmity.) His corruption continued unabated, from his longtime alliance with the Brown & Root oil company and his new ties to Texas bosses like George Parr, the legendary Duke of Duval. Both of those were central to his theft of the Senate seat in 1948. Caro exposes the details of the crime, aided by the confession of one of Parr's henchmen, who felt himself released from his vow of fealty to the Duke by the latter's death. Johnson's victory remained precarious, however, as several suits and countersuits were brought; in these, he gained the support of the White House, since he was expected to support Truman against the Dixiecrats, which his opponent would not have. It was, of all people, Hugo Black who made the final, critical ruling in Johnson's favor.
It is interesting to speculate on the two Senate bids. What if Johnson had won in 1941, or lost in 1948? In the former case, a bit more patience might have been enough to seal the victory; and what might Sen. Johnson's subsequent career have been like? FDR liked him; might Roosevelt have chosen to take advantage of his formidable campaigning (and other) skills in 1944, when he was searching for a new running mate? (Perhaps not; Texas, unlike Missouri, was safely Democratic...) If so, we get President Johnson twenty years early. Johnson would not, I suppose, have pushed through the Civil Rights Act of 1948; there would be no Dixiecrat walkout, the breakup of the Roosevelt coalition might have been postponed, and - I suspect - the 1960s might have been even more violent than they were. Then there's the question of Korea....
The other way: what if Johnson had lost in 1948? Fast forward to 1960: who does John Kennedy pick as his running mate? Surely not someone with Johnson's jawboning skills. Do we get the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965? Maybe not - and the summers get a little longer, and a little hotter. Maybe things turned out for the best after all....
One last, perhaps irrelevant comment. Brown & Root, which was so central to Johnson's political rise, was later absorbed into another Texas energy company... Halliburton. The more things change....
