More Skowronek
Mar. 27th, 2007 10:58 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
stoutfellowHaving read yet further, I'm getting a clearer picture of Skowronek's framework, and it seems that I may have misunderstood some things. In particular, his affiliation/opposition parameter appears to mean something a bit different from both my original understanding and the more nuanced version proposed by ![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
oilhistorian. More under the cut.
Skowronek recognizes two principal parameters that affect a president's standing. These are recurring parameters, set against a distinct secular trend towards broader-based politics; I'm not going to discuss the latter in this post. The first parameter is, as mentioned before, whether the president is elected in affiliation with or opposition to the status quo; the second is the resilience or vulnerability of that status quo. (Insert the usual caveats: the map is not the territory, these variables are continuous rather than discrete, and we're dealing with ideal types only.) This gives four different combinations.
The first combination is that of a president elected in opposition to a disintegrating status quo. Such a president has the most freedom of action of any, and has the opportunity to establish a new status quo. Skowronek identifies Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Reagan as exemplars. (Here, incidentally, seems to be the resolution of my earlier confusion; affiliation/opposition applies to the overarching system established by one of these revolutionaries, not merely to the party or policies of the previous incumbent.)
The second combination is that of a president affiliated to a still-strong status quo. This is a slightly weaker position, because the situation encourages a certain - not passivity, but lack of initiative, but the mere fact of being president encourages an attempt to establish one's own independence, which can lead to potentially disastrous overreaching. The problems Truman had in 1948, mostly connected with his civil rights initiatives, provide an example; Lyndon Johnson's flameout in the 1960s, likewise. A more careful leader - a Madison or a Coolidge - may survive better, but such a presidency is not going to be especially distinguished.
The third-strongest combination is that of a president opposed to a resilient system. A cautious president - an Eisenhower, for instance - can be reasonably successful in this context, though he is not in a position to seriously challenge the prevailing system. (Clinton may belong in this category as well.) A president who attempts to do so, in this position, risks disaster; Skowronek cites Tyler, Andrew Johnson, and Nixon.
The most unfortunate combination is that of a president affiliated to a collapsing status quo. This is a recipe for disaster and candidacy for the Worst President Ever list: J. Q. Adams, Buchanan, Hoover, and Carter wind up here.
Skowronek's typology interests me. (Ordinologist, remember?) Nonetheless, I have some concerns with it. Most importantly, the resilience/vulnerability parameter seems rather post-hoc to me; the measure of opposition/vulnerable vs opposition/resilient seems to be success in disrupting the status quo. Did Nixon fail because the system was still resilient, or because he wasn't capable enough to complete the realignment that had been brewing since 1948? (He certainly tried, with the Southern Strategy and the attempt to coax Southern Democrats into switching sides in 1970.)
I'm also intrigued by one oddity. Of the unfortunates in the fourth category, I notice that three - Adams, Hoover, and Carter - are on my list of Greatest Ex-Presidents: people whose post-presidential careers were notably more successful than their presidencies. (The fourth person on my list is Taft. It's notable, I think, that his successor Wilson, like Nixon, could possibly be classed as an abortive realigner.)
One final note: the election of 1896 is often classed as a realigning event, but McKinley does not fit in the first category. I'm not sure what to make of that, except to note that Skowronek's model doesn't capture everything important - but then, no model ever does.
oilhistorian. More under the cut.Skowronek recognizes two principal parameters that affect a president's standing. These are recurring parameters, set against a distinct secular trend towards broader-based politics; I'm not going to discuss the latter in this post. The first parameter is, as mentioned before, whether the president is elected in affiliation with or opposition to the status quo; the second is the resilience or vulnerability of that status quo. (Insert the usual caveats: the map is not the territory, these variables are continuous rather than discrete, and we're dealing with ideal types only.) This gives four different combinations.
The first combination is that of a president elected in opposition to a disintegrating status quo. Such a president has the most freedom of action of any, and has the opportunity to establish a new status quo. Skowronek identifies Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Reagan as exemplars. (Here, incidentally, seems to be the resolution of my earlier confusion; affiliation/opposition applies to the overarching system established by one of these revolutionaries, not merely to the party or policies of the previous incumbent.)
The second combination is that of a president affiliated to a still-strong status quo. This is a slightly weaker position, because the situation encourages a certain - not passivity, but lack of initiative, but the mere fact of being president encourages an attempt to establish one's own independence, which can lead to potentially disastrous overreaching. The problems Truman had in 1948, mostly connected with his civil rights initiatives, provide an example; Lyndon Johnson's flameout in the 1960s, likewise. A more careful leader - a Madison or a Coolidge - may survive better, but such a presidency is not going to be especially distinguished.
The third-strongest combination is that of a president opposed to a resilient system. A cautious president - an Eisenhower, for instance - can be reasonably successful in this context, though he is not in a position to seriously challenge the prevailing system. (Clinton may belong in this category as well.) A president who attempts to do so, in this position, risks disaster; Skowronek cites Tyler, Andrew Johnson, and Nixon.
The most unfortunate combination is that of a president affiliated to a collapsing status quo. This is a recipe for disaster and candidacy for the Worst President Ever list: J. Q. Adams, Buchanan, Hoover, and Carter wind up here.
Skowronek's typology interests me. (Ordinologist, remember?) Nonetheless, I have some concerns with it. Most importantly, the resilience/vulnerability parameter seems rather post-hoc to me; the measure of opposition/vulnerable vs opposition/resilient seems to be success in disrupting the status quo. Did Nixon fail because the system was still resilient, or because he wasn't capable enough to complete the realignment that had been brewing since 1948? (He certainly tried, with the Southern Strategy and the attempt to coax Southern Democrats into switching sides in 1970.)
I'm also intrigued by one oddity. Of the unfortunates in the fourth category, I notice that three - Adams, Hoover, and Carter - are on my list of Greatest Ex-Presidents: people whose post-presidential careers were notably more successful than their presidencies. (The fourth person on my list is Taft. It's notable, I think, that his successor Wilson, like Nixon, could possibly be classed as an abortive realigner.)
One final note: the election of 1896 is often classed as a realigning event, but McKinley does not fit in the first category. I'm not sure what to make of that, except to note that Skowronek's model doesn't capture everything important - but then, no model ever does.
