stoutfellow (![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
stoutfellow) wrote2004-10-17 05:52 pm
stoutfellow) wrote2004-10-17 05:52 pm
"The Radicalism of the American Revolution" 2
Continuing with the discussion of Gordon Wood's book:
Republicanism, as Wood describes it, refers to a social system in which the personal ties which characterize monarchy are replaced with more impersonal relationships. The independent individual, whose place in society arises from his merits rather than his bloodline, began to be seen as the ideal. This does not necessarily imply egalitarianism; the only people who could be trusted with public power were those who could act disinterestedly - those who had sufficient wealth not to be preoccupied with business affairs. For such people (the republican ideal held) it was a matter of duty to take on public responsibilities, requiring little or no recompense for their labors. Wood points to the example of Benjamin Franklin, who did not enter into public life until he retired from business.
The emerging state of society did not do away with social class, but it did put it on a new basis. That it went further faster in the American colonies was made possible by the narrower range of social levels among free whites; a wealthy American would have been of the second or lower rank in the mother country. Thus, it was easier to achieve a sufficient level of wealth for the assumption of public responsibility. The republican ideal was also boosted by the presence of slaves and indentured servants - far more of them, in proportion, than in Britain - who served as an abject reminder of what awaited someone who could not achieve autonomy.
With the coming of the Revolution, many of the more outspoken Tories found it prudent to leave the country; others were stripped of whatever privileges they had. Since Toryism was disproportionately widespread among the formal aristocracy of the colonies, their departure or dismissal shredded what remained of monarchical society. Though many eventually returned, their places had been filled by adherents to the republican ideal, and society could not revert to its previous state.
Perhaps the most interesting claim presented by Wood in this section is the assertion of the radical dreams of the revolutionary leaders - the belief that, via a properly designed system of education, republican virtues could be inculcated throughout the citizenry. Locke's psychology, with its assertion that the human mind begins as a blank slate, led naturally to the belief in this possibility (and Locke's own Some Thoughts on Education pointed the way); but it is disturbing how much this resembles the radical restructuring envisioned by the Soviet Union's ideologues.
It is in this section, I think, that Wood begins to justify his assertion that the American Revolution was a social as well as a political upheaval. The loosening and depersonalization of social bonds he describes was a long time a-borning - he claims that England itself was as republican as it was monarchical - but it came to a head in the colonies over a relatively short period, two or three decades perhaps, with the greatest part of it occuring during the years of the revolution. For his claim to succeed, though, requires his description of the initial state of the colonies, in the previous section, to be accepted; only that can make the changes of the period just before and during the Revolution seem as radical as he makes them out to be. As I've said before, I'm not in a position to judge those claims.
Republicanism, as Wood describes it, refers to a social system in which the personal ties which characterize monarchy are replaced with more impersonal relationships. The independent individual, whose place in society arises from his merits rather than his bloodline, began to be seen as the ideal. This does not necessarily imply egalitarianism; the only people who could be trusted with public power were those who could act disinterestedly - those who had sufficient wealth not to be preoccupied with business affairs. For such people (the republican ideal held) it was a matter of duty to take on public responsibilities, requiring little or no recompense for their labors. Wood points to the example of Benjamin Franklin, who did not enter into public life until he retired from business.
The emerging state of society did not do away with social class, but it did put it on a new basis. That it went further faster in the American colonies was made possible by the narrower range of social levels among free whites; a wealthy American would have been of the second or lower rank in the mother country. Thus, it was easier to achieve a sufficient level of wealth for the assumption of public responsibility. The republican ideal was also boosted by the presence of slaves and indentured servants - far more of them, in proportion, than in Britain - who served as an abject reminder of what awaited someone who could not achieve autonomy.
With the coming of the Revolution, many of the more outspoken Tories found it prudent to leave the country; others were stripped of whatever privileges they had. Since Toryism was disproportionately widespread among the formal aristocracy of the colonies, their departure or dismissal shredded what remained of monarchical society. Though many eventually returned, their places had been filled by adherents to the republican ideal, and society could not revert to its previous state.
Perhaps the most interesting claim presented by Wood in this section is the assertion of the radical dreams of the revolutionary leaders - the belief that, via a properly designed system of education, republican virtues could be inculcated throughout the citizenry. Locke's psychology, with its assertion that the human mind begins as a blank slate, led naturally to the belief in this possibility (and Locke's own Some Thoughts on Education pointed the way); but it is disturbing how much this resembles the radical restructuring envisioned by the Soviet Union's ideologues.
It is in this section, I think, that Wood begins to justify his assertion that the American Revolution was a social as well as a political upheaval. The loosening and depersonalization of social bonds he describes was a long time a-borning - he claims that England itself was as republican as it was monarchical - but it came to a head in the colonies over a relatively short period, two or three decades perhaps, with the greatest part of it occuring during the years of the revolution. For his claim to succeed, though, requires his description of the initial state of the colonies, in the previous section, to be accepted; only that can make the changes of the period just before and during the Revolution seem as radical as he makes them out to be. As I've said before, I'm not in a position to judge those claims.